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 A TEST OF NUTRITIONAL QUALITY SIGNALING
 IN FOOD MARKETS PRIOR TO
 IMPLEMENTATION OF MANDATORY LABELING
 ELIZA M. MOJDUSZKA AND JULIE A. CASWELL
 In May 1994, new nutrition labeling regulations went into effect in the United States requiring
 mandatory disclosure of information on the nutritional content of foods. This article uses Gross-
 man's model of totally effective quality signaling to evaluate whether markets were effective in
 information provision prior to the new regulation. If markets were effective in providing informa-
 tion to consumers on the nutritional quality of foods the new regulation would be unnecessary. The
 results of the logistic model, where the probability of voluntary information disclosure is linked to
 the nutritional quality of food products and their prices, indicate that private quality signaling was
 not reliably at work in food markets prior to implementation of the mandatory nutrition labeling
 regulation.
 Key words: food markets, nutrition labeling, quality signaling.
 The promulgation of the Nutrition Label-
 ing and Education Act (NLEA) in 1990
 marked a major step toward stricter nutrition
 labeling regulation in the United States. The
 NLEA went into effect in May 1994, requir-
 ing mandatory nutrition labeling in the form
 of a standardized nutrition information panel
 that shows the amounts of the macro- and
 micronutrients found in a food. In addition,
 voluntary nutrient content and health claims
 that are made outside the standardized infor-
 mation panel are circumscribed by the law.
 Prior to implementation of the NLEA, nutri-
 tion labeling was provided by manufacturers
 on a voluntary basis and government require-
 ments concerning nutrient content and health
 claims made on food packages were much
 less stringent.
 The NLEA relies heavily on requirements
 for information disclosure in an attempt to
 encourage consumers to demand foods with
 better nutritional profiles and to inspire man-
 ufacturers to produce higher quality foods.
 Information regulation might be very valu-
 able in the case of nutrition because con-
 sumers often cannot accurately evaluate the
 nutritional quality of specific brands of food
 products. Following Nelson (1970, 1974) and
 Darby and Karni, we can distinguish three
 groups of product attributes that explain
 how consumers learn about the quality of
 the products they purchase: search attributes
 (consumers can determine product quality
 at the point of purchase by looking at the
 product, examining, or researching it), experi-
 ence attributes (consumers cannot determine
 product quality until they buy the good and
 use it), and credence attributes (the quality
 cannot be learned even after consumption).
 As Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) argue, the
 nutritional attributes of specific brands of
 food should in general be viewed as cre-
 dence attributes. Therefore, if manufacturers
 are required to provide reliable information
 to consumers, nutritional quality can become
 a search attribute consumers can evaluate at
 the point of purchase.
 High-quality products may not be supplied
 in markets with imperfect and asymmetric
 information. If consumers have limited infor-
 mation about product quality, the markets
 may not exist or if they exist, the quality
 produced may be lower than in a world of
 perfect information. Market performance in
 the provision of high-quality goods depends
 greatly on the effectiveness of quality signal-
 ing by sellers to buyers.
 Quality signaling models provide valuable
 insights into how information on the qual-
 ity of experience attributes can be transmit-
 ted from producers to consumers, and as a
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 result help us understand how markets for
 quality work. For example, in his "market
 for lemons" model Akerlof considers a case
 where sellers cannot signal quality effectively
 so that the market may disappear completely
 or only the lowest quality products may be
 sold. On the other hand, Grossman's signal-
 ing model provides quite different results due
 to assumptions of totally effective, truthful,
 and costless quality signaling and verification
 of claims. Here markets for varying levels of
 quality exist and operate smoothly.
 Akerlof's model of totally ineffective qual-
 ity signaling is not applicable to nutrition
 labeling because a level of voluntary and
 truthful labeling occurred prior to the NLEA.
 Grossman's model provides an attractive
 framework for testing the effectiveness of
 the voluntary quality signaling process for
 nutrition because its final outcome depicts
 full transmission of information to consumers
 and a well functioning market for quality.
 Markets may supply reasonably adequate
 information to consumers on product qual-
 ity. If markets were effective in provision of
 information, establishing new regulations for
 mandatory nutrition labeling would have lit-
 tle effect on the demand and supply of food.
 The new regulations would, in fact, be unnec-
 essary. The impact of the NLEA depends on
 how the information environment changed
 after its implementation.
 As a means to begin to assess the impact
 of the NLEA, we use Grossman's totally
 effective quality signaling thesis to test the
 overall effectiveness of markets in provid-
 ing information on the nutritional quality
 of food products in the period from 1992
 to 1993, when labeling was voluntary. After
 1994, quality signaling was totally effective in
 the sense that nutrition labels were manda-
 tory and available on virtually all packaged
 food products sold in the United States. First,
 we outline the totally effective quality signal-
 ing hypothesis. Second, we specify and esti-
 mate an empirical model where the proba-
 bility of a voluntary information disclosure is
 linked to the nutritional quality of food prod-
 ucts and their prices. The final section pro-
 vides a summary of results and conclusions.
 The Totally Effective Quality
 Signaling Hypothesis
 Many quality attributes of market goods are
 not known to consumers and in some cases
 may not be known to producers. Models
 developed by Akerlof, Grossman, and other
 researchers explore the conditions under
 which information on product quality could
 be effectively supplied by markets and which
 allow for products of varying quality to be
 sold. Specifically, in his model Grossman
assumes that manufacturers can make ex-post
 verifiable claims, that verification of these
 claims is costless, that manufacturers never
 lie, and that consumers know that manufac-
 turers will make the most favorable claim
 possible for their products. Manufacturers
 who can make a quality claim (e.g., effec-
tively use a nutrition information panel on
 their product) will do so and consumers will
 assume that any firm not making a claim
 has low-quality products. Thus, consumers can
 lea n about a product's attributes before pur-
 hase by examining the product's claims or
 lack of them. In the period 1992-93 when
 nutrition labeling was voluntary, Grossman's
 model would have been effectively at work
 if high nutritional profile products carried
 nutrition information panels and those with
 low nutritional quality did not. Thus, the
 absence of nutrition labeling might be a
 good indicator of the low nutritive value of
 products.
 Here product quality is defined, using Lan-
 caster's approach, as a bundle of charac-
 teristics (attributes) that determine the per-
 formance of a given product (Lancaster).
 Similarly, the term quality of a food prod-
 uct is used to refer to overall character-
 istics (attributes) possessed by a product,
 for example, food safety, nutritional, value,
 package, and process attributes (Hooker and
 Caswell). The nutritional quality of a food
 product is viewed as an objective measure
 and is expressed by the amounts of differ-
 ent nutrients contained by the product. Large
 amounts of desirable nutrients (e.g., fiber,
 protein, vitamins) in a product indicate its
 high nutritional quality while large amounts
 of undesirable nutrients (e.g., fat, cholesterol,
 sodium) indicate its low nutritive value.
 If the market's operation results in full
 quality disclosure to consumers, government
 regulation of nutrition labeling would be
 unnecessary. As Ippolito and Mathios (1990,
 1993) suggested, this process would place the
 fewest constraints on manufacturers while
 still providing full and accurate information
 to consumers. In addition, Caswell noted that
 if this process was at work, we would expect
 to find nutrition labeling on products with
 300 May 2000 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
 good nutrition profiles and absent on those
 with less desirable profiles. A previous study
 of national brand meat and poultry products
 conducted in 1991 by Public Voice for Food
 and Health Policy could be interpreted to
 show such a pattern (Ingersoll). Therefore the
 hypothesis tested is that voluntary labeling of
 the nutritional content of food products in
 the United States conformed to Grossman's
 quality signaling thesis prior to implementa-
 tion of the NLEA and that this resulted in an
 information pattern in which products with
 higher nutritional quality were labeled and
 those with lower quality were not.
 Empirical Specification
 of the Logit Model
 To test the hypothesis we constructed an
 empirical model where the presence of a
 nutrition information panel on a food prod-
 uct is assumed to be a function of certain
 economic and product profile variables. This
 relationship can be represented by a statisti-
 cal model:
 k
 (1) = ai + E jXij + 3k+lPi + ei, j=1
 i=1,... , N
 where YI represents the presence of a nutri-
 tion information panel (food label) on the ith
 food product, Xij is the amount of nutrient j
 in product i, Pi is the price of the ith product,
 a is the intercept, pj and [k+1 are the coef-
 ficients to be estimated, and ei is a stochastic
 error term. The dependent variable, Yi, is a
 discrete (binary) manufacturer's choice vari-
 able and is defined as YI = 1 if a nutrient con-
 tent panel is present on the ith product, and
 Y = 0 if not. Due to difficulties in the use
 of standard linear regression techniques for
 the discrete choice model, several alternative
 procedures such as probit and logit models
 were described by Maddala. The logit model
 is used in this study.
 The explanatory variables are economic
 variables such as prices of food products,
 as well as nutrition profile variables such as
 calories, fat, cholesterol, sodium, fiber, and
 other macro- and micronutrient variables. If
 the data supported totally effective qual-
 ity signaling, the estimated coefficients of
 undesirable nutrients such as fat, cholesterol,
 and sodium-nutrients that most consumers
 wo ry about having too much of rather than
 too little--would be negative, showing that
 the higher their levels in a food the lowe
 the probability of the nutr tion information
 panel being present. Manufacturers of low
 nut itional quality brands would not want to
 disclose this information to consumers. On
 the other hand, the estimated c efficients of
 desirable nutrients such as fiber, protein, and
 vitamins would be positive because it would
 be in the manufacturers' interest, in order
 o maximize profits, to disclose information
 about the high nutritional quality of their
 brands.
 Nutrient content variables are used to mea-
 sure the nutritional quality of foods in this
 test of the Grossman thesis. An alternative
 approach is to construct and compute com-
 posite indexes of nutritional quality for each
 food product examined and use them as the
 independent variable. Utilizing this estima-
 tion technique might provide further insights.
 However, few indexes of overall nutritional
 quality exist. In addition, this approach would
 assume that consumers compute an overall
 nutritional quality index for food products
 rather than looking at nutrients separately.
 Price represents the only economic vari-
 able that was included in the logit model. This
 variable was used as a proxy for manufac-
 turers' production costs (marginal cost). Eco-
 nomic theory suggests that it is more costly
 to produce higher quality products and there-
 fore consumers have to pay higher prices
 fo  them. In addition, Frazao and Allshouse
 found that nutritionally improved versions of
 foods had higher prices than regular versions.
 Thus, if higher quality products were labeled
 (Grossman), the estimated coefficient of the
 price variable should be positive.
 Data
 This study is based on a unique data set that
 includes a complete census of all products
 in the most popular package size offered in
 thirty-three food product categories in a rep-
 resentative super-store in New England for
 each of the years 1992-99. The data are part
 of an ongoing survey designed to track the
 evolution of product offerings and label con-
 tent. The data set, which records changes in
 nutrition content and in health and nutrition
 claims on food products, includes between
 857 and 1,025 branded and private label
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 products for each year. Each product cat-
 egory is a major food group including, for
 example, cookies, desserts, entrees, packaged
 meats, cereal, soups, pasta sauces, and oils.
 Each food category contains from three to
 eighty-three different brands in each of the
 years. Fresh commodities were excluded from
 the study. The data were taken directly from
 food labels and provide information on the
 amounts of specific nutrients contained in dif-
 ferent food products as well as their prices.
 To estimate the logit model we used the
 data for the years 1992 and 1993. In these
 years nutrition labeling was voluntary and
 determined by manufacturers. Labels were
 presented in the form designed and regu-
 lated by FDA requirements established in
 1975. Although the NLEA was passed by
 the U.S. Congress in 1990, the final regula-
 tions were not published until January 1993,
 with the implementation deadline set for May
 1994. Therefore, the data for the period 1992-
 93 can be used to test the effectiveness of
 nutritional quality signaling prior to the new
 regulation.
 In order to estimate an empirical model
 as specified in the previous section, it was
 necessary to have nutrient values for all
 products, including those with and without
 nutrient content panels. The values of the
 nutrient content variables (Xij's) were miss-
 ing for products that did not carry nutrition
 information panels so these values had to
 be constructed in order to regress the binary
 choice dependent variable Yi on the indepen-
 dent nutrient content variables Xij's. Without
 this construction, it would not be possible to
 run regressions to test whether poor nutri-
 tional profiles affected the probability of a
 label being present. In 1992, approximately
 30% of branded products did not have a
 nutrition information panel, while in 1993 this
 percentage decreased to 28%.
 To construct the missing values of nutri-
 ents, 100 product brands with nutrition infor-
 mation panels were randomly selected across
 various food categories and then the nutri-
 ent contents of the same brands were com-
 pared in 1992, 1993, and 1994. Out of 100
 brands selected, about 92% had the same
 nutrient composition in 1992, 1993, and 1994.
 Based on this result, we concluded that con-
 structing the missing values of nutrients for
 products that did not carry nutrition infor-
 mation panels in earlier years (e.g., 1992)
 based on our own data for the same prod-
 uct in later years (e.g., 1993 or 1994) was the
 Table 1. Number of Brands Considered for
 the Lo it Model
 Number of Brands 1992 1993
 Total 987 982
 Wi h nutrition information panels 684 704
 With constructed nutrient content
 values 272 252
 Excluded 31 26
 bes  method for completing the data set. Fur-
 thermore, as Caswell and Mojduszka (1994)
 poi ted out, the period 1992-93 was very
 stagnant in product design with little change
 i  the nutritive composition of products.
 If a product had the same type of nutrient
 content claims in the years 1992 and 1993, the
 missing 1992 nutritive values were replaced
 with the values for 1993, if the product car-
 ried a nutrient content panel in 1993, or for
 1994 if the product did not carry a nutri-
 tion information panel in 1993. This assumes
 that nutritional content did not change signif-
 icantly over the period studied. Overall, 684
 of the 987 brands in 1992 and 704 of the
 982 brands in 1993 carried nutrition infor-
 mation panels (see table 1). Nutrition con-
 tent values were constructed for 272 brands
 in 1992 and 252 brands in 1993. In 1992,
 thirty-one brands were excluded from the
 analysis, twenty-eight because it was diffi-
 cult to construct their missing values and
 three because the shortening category was
 excluded from the analysis since its nutri-
 ent content was very uniform and there were
 few brands. In 1993, twenty-six brands were
 excluded (twenty-three due to data difficul-
 ties and three shortening brands).1
 To assure the validity of the results, it
 would be desirable to test whether the orig-
 inal and filled data sets could be pooled.
 However, it was impossible to perform this
 test because the dependent variable Yi was
 always equal to zero for products without
 labels and always equal to one for products
 with labels. Therefore, for purposes of the
 logit model, we assumed that original and
 replaced sets could be pooled.
 1Another data set published by the U.S. Department of Agri-
 culture (USDA) was also considered to construct nutrient con-
 tent values for products without nutrition information panels
 (Agriculture Handbook No. 8). However, the USDA data source
 did not have complete information on the nutritional composi-
 tion of specific brands of foods and was very difficult to match
 with our data, which would have introduced inaccuracies.
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 The complete data set containing thirty-
 two food product categories was grouped into
 twenty food groups, based on nutrition pro-
 file and the results of tests for pooling pre-
 sented in the next section. The number of
 nutrient content variables included in the
 logit model for each group varies according
 to the importance of specific nutrients for
 the entire group, collinearity among nutrient
 content variables, and data availability. Many
 of the characteristics listed on the nutrition
 information panel are highly correlated and
 the inclusion of a large number of character-
 istics would provide unreliable estimates due
 to multicollinearity. Therefore, it was neces-
 sary to select a reduced group of least linearly
 dependent nutritional characteristics to use.
 The variable selection criterion was based
 on the multicollinearity diagnostics suggested
 by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (see also John-
 son, Reimer, and Rothrock, and Belsley).
 The variables chosen represent nutritional
 attributes of foods that are important in U.S.
 diets, as indicated by inclusion on the NLEA
 nutrition panel, and that are least collinear
 (Mojduszka).
 Calorie, fat, and sodium content variables
 were included in the model for almost all
 of the food groups examined. The saturated
 fat, fiber, and sugar variables were used only
 for a few food groups because information
 on these nutrients was not required and very
 often not reported on nutrient content pan-
 els in 1992 and 1993. The cholesterol content
 variable was included in the estimations for
 only five groups because it was highly corre-
 lated with the fat content variable or its val-
 ues were close to zero and did not vary.
 The NLEA requires that the amounts of
 nutrients listed in the "Nutrition Facts" panel
 be based on standardized serving sizes to
 help consumers understand and compare the
 nutritional values of different foods. This was
 not the case prior to 1994 so the levels
 of nutrient content variables of each prod-
 uct in our data set were standardized based
 on serving sizes corresponding to the ref-
 erence amounts consumed on average by
 an adult person, as specified and defined in
 the new nutrition labeling regulations. As
 Caswell reported, manipulation (shrinking)
 of serving sizes was a significant issue in prod-
 uct categories with higher calorie, fat, and
 sodium before the new regulation went into
 effect.
 Model Estimation and Results
 The data set included thirty-two food prod-
 ct categories. To test whether data could
 be pooled across categories and years, we
 applied a procedure used by Ben-Akiva. The
 test statistic did not reject the null hypothe-
 sis that some food product categories could
 be pooled into food groups. Those cate-
 gories that could not be pooled with any
 other category were treated as single (indi-
 vidual) groups in the estimation of the logit
 model resulting in twenty groups overall
 being included in the analysis.2 In addition,
 the test statistic failed to reject the null
 hypothesis of equal coefficients in 1992 and
 1993 for all thirty-two categories.
 Estimates were obtained for a total of
 sixteen of the twenty food groups. Table 2
 reports estimates of the explanatory variables
 hypothesized to affect the probability of the
 presence of a nutrition information panel
 on food products. The table also includes
 the number of all observations in each food
 group, likelihood ratio test statistics, Mad-
 dala R2's, and percentage of right predic-
 tions. Because Yi, the dependent variable, was
 equal to 1 for all of the observations in
 three groups (yogurt, margarine and spreads,
 and cereal) it was impossible to obtain esti-
 mates for these groups. In addition, for the
 salted snacks group 182 brands were labeled
 and only seven brands did not have nutri-
 ion information panels; therefore the regres-
 sion results would be unreliable due to the
 lack of variation in the dependent variable.
 The logit model was estimated for fourteen
 food groups by a maximum likelihood pro-
 cedure. The logistic and probit models were
 rejected for oils and soft drinks based on cri-
 teria for assessing model fit and predictive
 power, including the Akaike information and
 the Schwartz criteria (see also Maddala; Preg-
 ibon; Landwehr, Pregibon, and Shoemaker).
 The linear probability model was applied to
 these groups, with regressions run using the
 ordinary least squares method.
 2 The twenty food groups are cookies, desserts (ice
 cream/frozen yogurt and novelties), baked goods (frozen and
 fresh sweet baked goods), salted snacks (crackers, corn chips,
 potato chips, and other salted snacks), entrees (single serving
 frozen entrees/frozen dinners, family pack frozen entrees, shelf
 stable entrees, and frozen pizza), meats (processed meats except
 bacon), bacon, cheese (hard and processed), yogurt, cereal,
 soup, pasta sauces, vegetables (canned tomatoes, other canned
 vegetables, and frozen vegetables), juices (frozen, bottled, and
 refrigerated), soft drinks, condiments, salad dressings, margarines
 and spreads, butter and peanut butter, and oils.
 Table 2. Logit Model Estimations for Selected Food Groups, 1992-93
 Coefficienta
 Variable Cookies Desserts Baked Goods Entrees Meats Bacon Cheese Soup
 Calories 0.0030 -0.0375* 0.0003 -0.0113* -0.0313 0.0002 -0.3587* -0.0104
 (0.1050) (-2.7822) (0.8124) (-2.1497) (-0.9322) (0.7341) (-2.4306) (-0.4625)
 Fat 0.1480 -0.1433* 0.0036 -0.1186* -0.1532* -0.7800 -0.8664* -0.1879
 (0.6823) (-3.2281) (0.1521) (-2.2370) (-3.1631) (-1.2661) (-3.2457) (-1.8238)
 Saturated fat -0.6018 / / / / / / /
 (-1.9090)
 Cholesterol 0.1456 / -0.0121 / 0.0312 -0.0951 0.2013* /
 (2.4336) (-1.4533) (0.7966) (-0.4031) (2.4241)
 Sodium 0.0049 0.0144* 0.0033 0.0023* -0.0001 0.0008 0.0083* 0.0002
 (0.5733) (2.1322) (0.9954) (2.0429) (-0.0534) (0.5546) (2.7019) (0.3656)
 Fiber / / / / / / / /
 Sugar / 0.0357* -0.0024 / / / / /
 (2.3211) (-0.8992)
 Protein / / / 0.2431* 0.1371 / -0.2314* 0.3845*
 (3.8121) (0.6528) (-2.5331) (2.8755)
 VitaminA / / / / / / / /
 ita i C / / / / / / / /
 Price 2.7049* 1.2144* 0.0302 -0.0525 -0.3867 3.0755 -1.0003 -0.2280
 (3.0022) (2.1082) (0.0795) (-0.2452) (-1.5344) (1.4432) (-1.0005) (-1.0033)
 Constant -5.1993 -1.7533 0.5823 0.3845 2.5833 -3.7866 1.8628 0.1001
 (-1.5331) (-1.8052) (0.4021) (0.5389) (1.7553) (-0.4655) (0.4990) (0.1233)
 n 86 113 59 162 86 31 106 99
 X2 24.4851 62.6433 3.0022 48.8260 15.1241 16.9077 60.8816 18.7644 Maddala R2 0.2503 0.4452 0.0542 0.2659 0.1704 0.4266 0.4627 0.1703
 % of right predict. 0.8235 0.7966 0.5822 0.7975 0.6856 0.8407 0.8996 0.7800
 %.
 c
 t
 t:
 Table 2. Continued.
 Coefficienta
 Variable Pasta Sauces Vegetables Juices Soft Drinksb Condiments Salad Dressings Butter & Peanut Butter Oilsb
 Calories 0.0214 0.0017 -0.0288* -0.0099* 0.0825 0.0007 0.00030 /
 (0.6671) (0.1626) (-2.4822) (-12.922) (1.1224) (0.0178) (0.3748)
 Fat -0.1323 / / / 1.2363 -0.3482 0.04622 0.9311*
 (-0.3941) (1.5571) (-1.0268) (0.6411) (7.1898)
 Saturated fat / / / / / / / 0.0243
 (0.3858)
 Cholesterol / / / / / / / /
 Sodium -0.0010 0.0007* 0.0002 0.0022* -0.0149 -0.0015 -0.0028 /
 (-0.4420) (2.0877) (0.0882) (2.3694) (-1.4471) (-0.6444) (-0.4544)
 Fiber / 0.3648* / / / / / /
 (4.1806)
 Sugar / / 0.0421 0.0071* / / / /
 (1.1275) (2.4759)
 Protein / / / / / / / /
 Vitamin A / 0.0053 / / / / / /
 (1.3512)
 Vitamin C / 0.03101 0.0063 / / / / /
 (1.0654) (1.7211)
 Price -1.1393 -0.6325 0.2679 0.0026 -1.7196* -0.1610 -1.0001 -0.0591*
 (-1.3016) (-1.3922) (0.6254) (0.4777) (-2.4048) (-0.2499) (-1.1322) (-2.1688)
 Constant 2.7713 -1.6022 1.4800 0.8039* 1.2051 3.9200 1.7883 -11.956*
 (1.0693) (-1.3104) (1.1354) (7.5041) (0.8245) (1.8490) (1.3221) (-6.6377)
 n 51 92 95 78 58 72 41 50
 X2 2.9871 39.9766 12.8921 167.610(F) 46.3273 34.1114 1.9706 18.784(F)
 Maddala R2 0.0569 0.3542 0.1269 0.8875(R2) 0.5501 0.3773 0.0502 0.5506(R2)
 % of right predict 0.8235 0.7682 0.6421 0.8966 0.8056 0.7251
 * Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tail test).
 a Wald statistics are in parentheses.
 Linear probability model estimation.
 ft I
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 First, likelihood ratio tests were conducted
 to test the significance of the effect of the
 nutritional quality of foods and their prices
 on voluntary nutrition labeling. For all the
 food groups except baked goods, pasta sauces,
 and butter and peanut butter, the likelihood
 ratio test statistics rejected the null hypothe-
 sis that the explanatory variables other than
 the intercept had no impact on the manu-
 facturer's choice probability. The logit model
 correctly predicted between 58 and 90% of
 the observations for all of the food groups.
 The values of the Maddala R2 statistic, a mea-
 sure of model performance, ranged from a
 low of 0.05 for the butter and peanut but-
 ter group to a high of 0.55 for the condi-
 ments group. These results provide evidence
 that the nutritional quality and price of food
 had a significant impact on the voluntary dis-
 closure of information in thirteen of twenty
 food groups considered in this study.
 Our analysis of the estimates of the logis-
 tic model begins with horizontal (nutrient by
 nutrient) analysis. The calorie variable was
 considered in all of the food groups except
 oils. The significant (at the 5% level) and neg-
 ative coefficients on the calorie variable in
 the desserts, entrees, cheese, juices, and soft
 drinks groups showed that manufacturers of
 products containing more calories were less
 likely to disclose their nutrient content levels.
 This result is consistent with a totally effec-
 tive quality signaling model. In the remaining
 ten food groups the calorie content variable
 was insignificant suggesting that the calorie
 level in these foods did not affect the prob-
 ability of a nutrition information panel being
 present on food packages. This result is incon-
 sistent with the totally effective quality sig-
 naling thesis.
 Fat, an important macronutrient variable,
 was included in the model for thirteen food
 groups. The estimated coefficients on fat
 among the food groups of desserts, entrees,
 meats, and cheese were statistically significant
 and negative. This suggests that food prod-
 ucts in these groups with lower fat content
 were more likely to carry a nutrition informa-
 tion panel than other products. Within these
 high fat foods, the fat level had a signifi-
 cant and negative effect on the probability of
 nutrition labels being present on food prod-
 uct packages. On the other hand, for the oils
 group, the estimated coefficient on the fat
 variable was highly significant and positive,
 which means that in this group a higher level
 of fa  content did not decrease the probabil-
 ity of nutrition labeling. This result suggests
 that disclosure of information on the nutri-
 ent content of oils did not conform to Gross-
 man's thesis. It is noteworthy that the oils
 group consists of high fat content products.
 Therefore, it would be more appropriate to
 test ow the content of saturated, polyunsat-
 urated, or other fatty acids affected the prob-
 ability of voluntary information disclosure in
 this group. Information on saturated fat was
 available for most of the brands and the sat-
 urated fat content variable was included in
 the estimation of the linear probability model
 for the oils group. However, its effect on the
 pr bab lity of nutrition labeling was statisti-
 cally insignificant. This might be due to higher
 collinearity between the fat and saturated fat
 variables. The coefficients on fat among the
 eight remaining food groups were insignif-
 icant and thus did not support Grossman's
 thesis.
 The saturated fat variable was included
 in one additional group (cookies) and the
 cholesterol variable was included in five
 groups (cookies, baked goods, meats, bacon,
 and cheese) for the logit model estimation.
 The effect of these nutrients on the manu-
 facturer's choice probability was not signifi-
 cant in any of these cases except for choles-
 t rol in cheese. This might result from high
 collinearity between fat and saturated fat,
 and between fat and cholesterol.
 Another macronutrient variable, sodium,
 was included in the model for all of the
 f od groups except oils. The estimated coef-
 ficients on sodium for food groups such as
 desserts, entrees, cheese, vegetables, and soft
 dr nks were statistically significant but pos-
 itive. This suggests that food products with
 low sodium content within these food groups
 were not more likely to carry a nutrition label
than other products. In this case, Grossman's
 hypothesis was not supported by our data.
 The sodium content of food products in these
 groups did not have a negative effect on the
 probability that these products were labeled
 for their nutrient levels. However, desserts,
 ch ese, and soft drinks, as well as vegetables,
 do not belong to high sodium content groups.
 The means of sodium content for these food
 groups were 60, 264, 37, and 302 mg per serv-
 ing, respectively. This compares, for exam-
ple, to the soup group where the mean level
 of sodium was 954 mg per serving. In the
 soup group as well as in the remaining ten
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 groups, the coefficient on sodium was statis-
 tically insignificant and did not conform to
 Grossman's model.
 One of the most important desirable nutri-
 ents, fiber, was considered in the vegetables
 group only and its effect was significant and
 positive which means that the higher the
 fiber content the more likely it was that veg-
 etable products carried nutrition labels in the
 years 1992-93. The fiber variable was not
 included in the model for any other food
 groups because of missing data problems.
 Sugar was considered in the desserts, baked
 goods, juices, and soft drinks groups. The
 estimated coefficient for the sugar content
 variable was positive and significant in the
 desserts and soft drinks groups, which means
 that higher sugar content did not decrease
 the probability of a label being present on
 products in these groups.
 The protein variable was considered for
 the estimation of the logit model for entrees,
 meats, cheese, and soups. For the entrees,
 cheese, and soup groups estimated coeffi-
 cients on protein were significant; however,
 they were positive for two groups: entrees
 and soups, whereas in the cheese group the
 effect of protein on the probability of nutri-
 tion labeling was negative. For meats the
 coefficient on the protein variable was posi-
 tive but insignificant. Lastly, two other desir-
 able nutrients, vitamin A and vitamin C, were
 included for vegetables and juices. In both
 cases the estimated coefficients were not sta-
 tistically significant.
 Price is included as an economic variable
 in the estimation of the logit model for all of
 the food groups as a proxy for manufacturers'
 production costs. The estimated coefficient
 of the price variable was positive and sig-
 nificant in two groups, cookies and desserts.
 Within these two groups products with higher
 prices were more likely to have nutrition
 information panels. In two additional groups,
 condiments and oils, the estimated coeffi-
 cient of price was significant but negative,
 which indicated that higher priced products
 within these groups were less likely to carry
 a nutrition label. For the remaining twelve
 food groups the price variable was not signif-
 icant. The above results suggest that, overall,
 there was no significant relationship between
 prices (manufacturers' cost) and voluntary
 disclosure of information on the nutritional
 quality of food. Higher prices did not trans-
 late nto a higher probability of information
 disclosure.3
 Yatchew and Griliches have examined the
 issue of potential problems associated with
 omission of a significant variable in the set-
 ti g of probit and logit models. They found
 that even if the omitted variable is uncor-
 related with the included one, the coeffi-
 cient on the included variable will be incon-
 sistent. Any of the three standard methods
 of hypothesis testing (i.e., the Wald, likeli-
 hood ratio, or Lagrange multiplier tests) can
 be used to analyze the specification prob-
 lem associated with omitting price from the
 estimations. The likelihood ratio test shows
 what happened when the price variable was
 excluded from the model for the cookies,
 desserts, condiments, and oils groups. In all of
 these foods, the price variable was significant.
 The null hypothesis tested was that 3prce = 0
 for each of the above four groups. The likeli-
 hood ratio (LR) statistics were computed as:
 (2) LR = -2[ln L, - In L]
 where In Lr and In L are the log-likelihood
 functions evaluated at the restricted and
 unrestricted estimates, respectively. For all
 four categories, the hypothesis that the coef-
 ficient on the price variable was zero was
 rejected. Thus, if the price variable was not
 considered for the estimation of the logit
 model the estimated coefficients of the other
 included variables would be inconsistent.4
 To be able to draw conclusions about the
 overall effectiveness of private quality signal-
 ing, it is also useful to analyze the impact of
 nutritional quality on labeling by food groups
 (vertical analysis). As noted earlier, within
 the four food groups of salted snacks, cereal,
 yogurt, and margarine and spreads, almost
 all products were labeled so there was no
 3 Inclusion of the price variable as an independent (exogenous)
 variable creates a question whether the estimates obtained from
 a single equation method suffer from simultaneous equation bias,
 which would be the case if the price variable was determined
 endogenously. A Hausman test was used for independence of
 the regressors and stochastic error term, to examine whether the
 estimated coefficients are unbiased (Smith, Even). This test, using
 annual total expenditures on advertising (in million of dollars) on
 each brand for the cookies, soft drinks, and soup categories as an
 extra exogenous variable, indicated that there is no simultaneity
 bias and that the maximum likelihood estimates for cookies, soft
 drinks, and soups are consistent. We were unable to test the other
 product categories due to data availability.
 4 When the price variable was excluded from the model, the
 magnitudes of the estimated coefficients changed. In addition,
 the coefficient on the sodium variable in the condiments group
 changed sign from negative to positive but remained insignifi-
 cant. The significance of the estimated coefficients did not change
 in any of the four food groups.
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 relationship between voluntary disclosure of
 information and the amounts of nutrients in
 these foods. Grossman's thesis was not sup-
 ported for products within these groups. In
 addition, the whole regressions were insignifi-
 cant for baked goods, pasta sauces, and butter
 and peanut butter and also did not support
 Grossman's model.
 In a further four food groups, cookies,
 bacon, condiments, and salad dressings, the
 hypothesized quality signaling process for
 nutrient content can also be rejected. No
 nutrient content variables were statistically
 significant in these groups. For cookies the
 estimated coefficient on price was statistically
 significant and positive which suggests that in
 this food group price (manufacturers' costs)
 had a significant and positive effect on the
 probability of nutrition information panels
 being present on packages. When the price of
 cookies was higher the probability of labeling
 for their nutritional quality was also higher.
 For condiments the price variable was statis-
 tically significant but negative. Price was not
 significant in explaining labeling probability
 for either bacon or salad dressings. On the
 other hand, in the oils group the fat content
 had a significant but positive effect on the
 probability of information disclosure and the
 price variable was statistically significant but
 negative. Overall, the hypothesized pattern of
 quality signaling was not supported by our
 data in these five food groups.
 For eight other food groups, desserts,
 entrees, meats, cheese, soup, vegetables, juices,
 and soft drinks, the results are inconclu-
 sive because, for example, one undesirable
 nutrient had a negative effect and another
 undesirable nutrient had a positive or no
 effect on the probability of information dis-
 closure. Also within the soup group the fat
 and sodium content variables were not statis-
 tically significant; however, the protein vari-
 able was statistically significant and positive.
 To be able to provide more conclusive results
 for these groups it would be necessary to
 rank nutrients according to their importance
 within a group. For example, if we rank fat
 as more important than sodium the qual-
 ity signaling thesis would be supported in
 the desserts, entrees, meats, and cheese food
 groups. If we rank fiber higher than sodium
 then the results would be consistent with
 Grossman's model for vegetables. If we con-
 sider protein as more important than fat and
 sodium then Grossman's thesis would be sup-
 ported for the soup group. If we evaluate
 calories as more important than sodium then
 Grossman's model would be supported in
 five additional food groups: desserts, entrees,
 cheese, juices, and soft drinks.
 Overall, the results of the test of Gross-
 man's model show that private quality signal-
 ing was not reliably at work in food markets
 prior to implementation of mandatory nutri-
 tion labeling. There was no clear, consistent
 pattern in what types of products within food
groups carried nutrition information panels
and consumers could not reliably assume that
 a product without a nutrition information
 panel had a poorer nutrition profile.
 Conclusions
 This study investigated the effectiveness of
 markets in providing information to con-
 sumers on the nutritional quality of processed
 foods. Grossman's model of totally effective
 quality signaling was used to test whether
 markets were effective in information provi-
 sion prior to implementation of the Nutri-
 tion Labeling and Education Act of 1990.
 Our data set allowed quantification of the
 nutritional quality of food products by mea-
 suring their nutritional characteristics. It also
 allowed estimation of the effect of these
 nutritional characteristics on the probability
 of voluntary information disclosure.
 According to Grossman's model, voluntary
 information provision on the nutritional qual-
 ity of processed foods would have been effec-
 tive if higher quality products had nutrition
 information panels on their packages and
 those with lower quality did not. In this case
consumers would be able to distinguish the
 nutritional quality of food products at the
 point of purchase. With effective private qual-
 ity signaling, government regulation of nutri-
 tion labeling would be unnecessary.
 Our test of a model of totally effective
 nutritional quality signaling provided mixed
 r sults from one food group to another.
 For example, within the four food groups
 of salted snacks, cereal, yogurt, and mar-
 garine and spreads there was no relation-
 ship between voluntary nutritional labeling
 and the nutritional profile of food products
 because almost all products were labeled
regardless of their nutritional profiles. While
 not directly supporting the Grossman model,
these food groups could be viewed as hav-
 ing relatively effective quality signaling in
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 that most products were labeled and cross-
 category comparisons (e.g., margarine and
 spreads versus butter) could be facilitated. In
 the three additional groups of baked goods,
 pasta sauces, and butter and peanut but-
 ter, the whole regressions were insignificant
 thus not supporting Grossman's model. In
 the four other food groups of cookies, bacon,
 condiments, and salad dressings there were
 no significant nutritional characteristics vari-
 ables. For oils a significant but positive coef-
 ficient on fat did not support Grossman's
 thesis. Within the eight other food groups
 of desserts, entrees, meats, cheese, soup, veg-
 etables, juices, and soft drinks, the estimated
 regressions did not provide conclusive results.
 In summary, the theoretical assumptions
 of a totally effective quality signaling model
 were not broadly supported in the real world
 market for nutritional quality. Incentives for
 voluntary disclosure of nutritional content by
 food processing companies did not generally
 result in reliable and consistent quality sig-
 nals to consumers. In this setting, require-
 ments for mandatory nutrition labeling were
 likely to increase significantly the amount of
 information available to consumers.
 [Received May 1998;
 accepted July 1999.]
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